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| 1 | IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
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| 2 | FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON |
| 3 | AYMAN LATIF, et al.,) Case No. CV-10-750-BR |
| 4 | Plaintiffs, |
| 5 | v.) January 21, 2011 |
| 6 7 | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF) JUSTICE, Eric H. Holder, Jr.,) Attorney General, et al.,) |
| 8 |) Defendants.) |
| 9 |) Portland, Oregon |
| 10 | TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS |
| 11 | (Oral Argument) |
| 12 | |
| 13 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANNA J. BROWN, DISTRICT JUDGE |
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(Friday, January 21, 2011; 1:30 p.m.)

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: I apologize in advance. I have a cold, and if I need to interrupt your presentations with coughs, it's not intentional.

We are here for argument on the Motion to Dismiss the Government defendants filed in the case of Latif versus Holder, which is Civil No. 10-750.

Counsel, would you all please introduce yourselves, since I'm not sure I've had the pleasure.

MR. WILKER: Your Honor, Steven Wilker for the plaintiffs. With me are Kevin Diaz of the ACLU of Oregon,

Nusrat Choudhury, and Ben Wizner of the National ACLU, who will be handling the argument today.

THE COURT: Mr. Wizner will be?

MR. WIZNER: I will. And Ms. Choudhury -- if you hear argument on the Motion to Strike, Ms. Choudhury will speak to that. And I will speak to the Motion to Dismiss, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon.

MS. KELLEHER: Your Honor, Diane Kelleher and Amy Powell on behalf of the defendants. We're both from the Department of Justice. And I will be addressing Motion to Dismiss, and Ms. Powell will be addressing the Motion to

Strike.

THE COURT: All right. Before we get to those arguments, I need help understanding the nature of the claim or claims the plaintiffs seek to bring, and I think you can understand why.

The Court has explicit precedent it must follow from the Ninth Circuit decision in **Ibrahim**. I am struggling to parse the decision that does control my view of my ruling on issues that are raised in this case.

And I'm trying to understand how that decision applies to what it is the plaintiffs are purporting to include in their complaint.

One of the problems is that the plaintiffs' complaint does not comply with Rule 8.

It is not a plain and concise statement of the facts or the elements of a claim. And plaintiffs need to file an amended complaint at some point, and I'll direct you when, because there is not any way this complaint, in the form presented, can be litigated according to the rules of procedures. It is an evidentiary recitation of a number of experiences the plaintiffs have encountered.

That's not how one writes a complaint for relief in federal court.

I can't even tell if you're suing under Section 1983 or some other gateway. I don't know what the basis is for you

to be in court in the first instance, because I can't tell.

You're alleging a claim for attorney -- for attorney fees in

your prayer. I can't tell where that arises.

I think it is necessary, before the Court is expected to analyze whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim or whether there's jurisdiction, for the plaintiffs to do the work necessary to ensure that, as presented, the complaint or an amended complaint actually alleges plainly and concisely the elements of a claim.

There are 90-plus pages in the First Amended

Complaint. 86 of them go to reciting evidence. And then we get to a section called claims, but I'm not even told what they are, and I'm not told what structure plaintiffs are invoking in order for there to be an analysis in the first instance. So I would like, first, to start with giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to explain to me what is the gateway you're using to be in federal court.

Is this intended to be a Section 1983 claim? A **Bivens** claim against the federal actors? What is it?

A breach of a constitutional right is ordinarily presented in the form of a Section 1983 claim or in the section of some statutory claim that's invoked: Title VII, the ADA.

I don't see any orientation in this complaint. Maybe I'm missing it. But I -- I really need foundation before we can get to the loftier issues I know you're eager to discuss.

MR. WIZNER: First and foremost, your Honor, the claim seeks only — the lawsuit seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief. So it's most certainly not a **Bivens** claim. There is no claim for damages included in this lawsuit.

And the basis for jurisdiction is the Administrative Procedure Act, which is cited in the complaint as a basis for jurisdiction. And we allege that defendants' actions in preventing our clients from boarding commercial aircraft and by thereafter not providing a constitutionally adequate process for them to remove themselves from Government watch lists violates both the APA and the due process clause of the Constitution —

THE COURT: It's the due process clause part that causes me concern because, when a person comes to federal court to allege the violation of a constitutional right generically, that is typically framed as a Section 1983 claim or a **Bivens** claim. A claim against a state or a federal actor that a person's constitutional rights have been violated.

And so I'm -- I'm struggling, when you get to this undefined due process right, to understand the context in which I'm supposed to evaluate the sufficiency of the claim.

MR. WIZNER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I get that an APA claim is an APA claim. One has to have a procedure, and then one goes through an APA analysis.

But when you go beyond that to say, And we have a federal constitutional right to this or that or the other thing, and the defendants are depriving us of that right, there needs to be a procedural vehicle, doesn't there?

MR. WIZNER: Well, your Honor, the APA can in fact be a procedural vehicle for the litigation of our constitutional claims, as well as of our statutory claims. And I'm just looking at what else we've invoked.

THE COURT: Well, this is the problem with the complaint.

As I say, at 90 pages, it is not a plain and concise statement of the facts. It is not an articulation that says, plainly, plaintiffs are invoking the jurisdiction of this court under the Administrative Procedures Act to redress the following and, in so many words, state the claim.

MR. WIZNER: And, your Honor, with respect to the length of the complaint, perhaps the majority of those factual allegations were relevant to claims that have since been resolved in connection with our preliminary injunction.

So it's very likely --

THE COURT: So imagine -- imagine a clean slate.

And imagine you were telling me what the allegations of plaintiffs' complaints were, in a plain and concise way.

What would you tell me?

MR. WIZNER: The allegations of this complaint are

precisely what I just said, your Honor. That -- that

plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest -- several liberty interests that have been

identified: In being free from unconstitutional stigma, in

being able to travel without undue restrictions, in

nonattainder. And that the Government's having placed them

into this federal terrorism watch list, without giving them any

constitutionally adequate process for removing themselves,

violates their rights under the Fifth Amendment and the

Administrative Procedure act.

THE COURT: So at page 87 of the First Amended Complaint, under something you call a count for procedural due process, the use of the nomenclature "counts" is also quite confusing in the way you've styled this. But let's just get to paragraph 384.

It is alleged plaintiffs are entitled to a legal mechanism that affords them notice and an opportunity to contest their inclusion on terrorist watch lists.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a legal mechanism that affords them notice and an opportunity to contest the deprivation of their liberty interests, including but not limited to the interests you've just summarized.

Then it's alleged defendants have violated plaintiffs' rights without affording them due process of law, and will continue to do so in the future.

Now, when one looks at those allegations in the context of the issue -- one of the issues raised by the defendants' Motion to Dismiss specifically, the jurisdictional limitation to have a judicial review of an order of the TSA in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, it's important to me to know whether plaintiffs are alleging -- for example, in paragraph 384 -- that contesting their inclusion is an opportunity that should occur before they are placed on an alleged terrorist watch list. Because it would be much more clear what it is plaintiffs were focusing on. And it would be easier to apply **Ibrahim**, which focused -- and to distinguish the other cases we've been talking about -- which focused upon the end of the process, as opposed to the beginning of the process. So --

MR. WIZNER: I can clarify that.

THE COURT: I don't mean to be critical, but the complaint is an essential tool in trying to analyze this moving target.

I need you to tell me what is the process that you -- MR. WIZNER: Right.

THE COURT: -- what is the process? Where in the process does the court -- trial court's jurisdiction stop? Are you on the side of the process in terms of its continuity, where the -- a trial court might have jurisdiction to consider the issues? Or are you on the part of the continuum where it

is absolutely clear that only the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia has jurisdiction?

Where in a continuum, then, does **Ibrahim** fall that controls me? And I can't even ask the defendants to make their argument until I know more what it is you're asserting. So --

MR. WIZNER: Your Honor, can I --

THE COURT: -- will you help me, please.

MR. WIZNER: I would like to answer the question you specifically raised there, which is what kind of process and at what stage are we saying that our plaintiffs have due process rights.

And I had thought we had been clear, and I apologize if we weren't. That we are not seeking pre-deprivation notice. We have never claimed and do not claim that individuals have a right to be notified that they are going to be placed on a watch list before they're placed on a watch list. This case is about post-deprivation notice.

THE COURT: So do you -- do you mean, then, in paragraph 384, to use the word "inclusion"? Or do you mean to allege there to contest their continuation?

Because inclusion implies the decision to include them in the first place, as opposed to -- and you've just told me you're not contesting the notion that the Government might be able to make a decision to include a plaintiff in the first instance.

What you want is, somewhere else along the way, a process --

MR. WIZNER: Right, your Honor. From the moment that an individual attempts to board a plane and is turned back, is not permitted to board the plane, when it — essentially that person, we believe, has been put on some kind of notice that the Government has an interest in that person. From that moment we believe that due process requires a name-clearing hearing. An opportunity for that person — preferably before the agency, if the agency has a process that meets constitutional minimums; if necessary, in the federal court, if the agency refuses to do that — that gives that person notice of the charges and an opportunity to rebut any evidence or innuendo.

THE COURT: So I'm still back at paragraph 384. And I'm still confused by --

MR. WIZNER: By the wording.

THE COURT: -- what continuum do you contend -Counsel, it won't be helpful if you keep pulling on his sleeve.

I've got to have his attention, please.

What is the continuum where the process ensues — where in the process, critical to **Ibrahim** and the statutory limitation of this Court's jurisdiction is it you contend there is room for district court jurisdiction?

I thought you were going to tell me you did want a

process before inclusion, and that's why your case is different from **Ibrahim**, and that's why this Court might have a basis not to dismiss the complaint.

But you've just taken that off the table.

MR. WIZNER: Well, we think our case is not different from **Ibrahim** but covered by **Ibrahim**, for the reason that in **Ibrahim**, the decision maker — the person who was responsible for what we believe is the constitutional injury and is capable of providing relief — is not the TSA. And so that there can't be an order of the TSA involved when —

THE COURT: But you just told me that the process you want is at the gate, is at the airport. That's what TSA is all about.

MR. WIZNER: No. I'm sorry, your Honor. I didn't mean that the process was at the gate. I meant, that at that point there needs to be a process, either before the agency or in a court, that is available to someone in that situation.

I'm a little confused by your questions about **Ibrahim**, because our belief that this case is covered by **Ibrahim** doesn't depend on this continuum question but on the core fact that here, as in **Ibrahim**, it's an entity called the Terrorist Screening Center, and not the TSA, that is capable of effectuating the relief that we seek.

The defendants -- sorry. The -- there are declarations submitted by the Government that concede that TSA

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is not responsible for placing our clients on a No Fly List, and it is without authority to remove them from a No Fly List. That those decisions are controlled by the TSC, which is controlled by the FBI. That was the core holding of Ibrahim. And that's why we believe this Court has jurisdiction. Because at whatever point in the process it occurs, it can't be an order of the TSA. But -- but --THE COURT: Why can't it be an order of the TSA if what you're telling me is you want process after your clients run into trouble at the airport? That's what you just told me. MR. WIZNER: Right. After our clients run into trouble at the airport, they seek a place where they can turn and get relief from that trouble. The Government has created a kind of mechanism that involves applying for redress to TSA and to DHS. The problem with that mechanism is that neither TSA nor DHS has any authority to provide the relief that our plaintiffs and other travelers are seeking. And this is why -- again, as in **Ibrahim** -- it is another --THE COURT: What do they have the authority to provide?

MR. WIZNER: Well, that's an excellent question.

that's really a question for opposing counsel.

According to TSA's declarations, they receive the complaints from the travelers. They then forward them to the Terrorist Screening Center. The Terrorist Screening Center reviews the situation, consults with other Government agencies, makes a decision about whether the -- the -- the complainant should be on the No Fly List or not, reports that decision to the TSA, and the TSA then writes a letter to the complainant.

Now, those letters say virtually the same thing every time. They say, If there was an action that we should have taken, we took it.

And I don't think that there is any case cited by the Government, or in existence, in which a so-called final order of an agency, number one, was written by an agency that doesn't have authority over the issue in question; and No. 2 --

THE COURT: Your view of the TSA here is that it is simply a bureaucratic arm of the defendant decision makers?

MR. WIZNER: In this case, it is. In fact they describe themselves as a central processing point. That's in the TSA's declaration in this case. They say they are a central processing point. They relay the decision of the Terrorist Screening Center to the individuals.

And, again, I haven't seen any case cited by the Government anywhere where, No. 1, the letter is issued by an entity that is not the decision maker and doesn't have

authority over this decision; and, No. 2, doesn't take a position on the relief requested.

THE COURT: What did Congress mean, then -- let me try it another way.

MR. WIZNER: Yeah.

THE COURT: What did Congress mean, then, when it limited appellate review or judicial review to the particular forum identified, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia? What is it that Congress has authorized only that court to consider?

MR. WIZNER: Well, if you look at a case like **Gilmore**, the Ninth Circuit's decision in **Gilmore**, there you had a security directive of the TSA.

It was the TSA's own policy that the TSA promulgated and enforced and had authority to enforce on the ID requirements for boarding a plane. There was no dispute between the parties that this was a TSA security directive.

The No Fly List, according to **Ibrahim**, is a security directive of the Terrorist Screening Center.

So if those letters are orders at all — and for a variety of reasons, we don't think that the letters that our clients got are orders, because they don't meet the criteria for being orders in the first place. But if they are orders, they're orders of the Terrorist Screening Center that are simply relayed by TSA.

I -- I -- I want to go back to your question about Congress. It is true, as defendants point out, that Congress did charge TSA and DHS with setting up a redress process.

This was the argument that the United States put forward in the **Ibrahim** case, and it's the argument that the **Ibrahim** dissent made in saying that for that reason these were orders.

But, again, it was the dissent. And the majority of **Ibrahim** said that the determinative point was that it was a

separate Government agency that was at -- responsible for

creating and maintaining the No Fly List.

THE COURT: What is the status of the holding in Ibrahim? That case is still pending?

MR. WIZNER: The Government might be in a better position to answer that. It is a very confusing case. Claims against lots of different parties. Some for damages, some for injunctive relief.

It was being litigated simultaneously in two circuits:

In the Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit and also in the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Some of the claims have been dismissed, some have been settled. And I don't know if there's still a pending appeal in **Ibrahim**. I think there is still a pending appeal in **Ibrahim**.

But the --

THE COURT: So, Mr. Wizner, back to the complaint,

what it is you're seeking to litigate on behalf of your clients. You've clearly, in 80-plus pages of evidentiary allegations, asserted they've all encountered difficulties; either trying to travel out of the United States or to return to the United States using the airlines. And that they believe that they've been designated onto a list in some manner, by some Government action. I get that.

You're contending that each of your clients -- the citizens and those who are otherwise lawfully here -- have a Fifth Amendment due process right once they -- once they each become aware that they have been flagged for secondary screening or have been affirmatively designated not to fly, even though they learn that through hearsay or some other mechanism, because it seems the official vehicle is still -- if you are on the list, we've done what we're supposed to do to ensure that you're either there or not there appropriately.

But your contention is once they know, once they've encountered a problem, it is at that stage they're entitled to some process different from the redress process?

MR. WIZNER: Yes, your Honor. And I should clarify just a little bit.

You've described the relief we're seeking. It may well be that our clients have Fifth Amendment rights that begin at an earlier point. We recognize that the Government has a much stronger interest in not providing notice before our --

our people have had difficulty flying. Because it may well be that there are people on the No Fly List who are on criminal wanted lists, who — who really have warrants out there for their arrests. And to send them a letter saying, You're on the No Fly List would be a tipoff. And that's why our lawsuit doesn't challenge that part of the No Fly List.

We say, once the travelers have been functionally notified, that interest really disappears. They disagree. We think it does.

And at that point the constitutional minimum would be a process that gives them some meaningful notice of the reason for the Government's decision that they can't board a plane, and some fair opportunity for them to rebut that evidence.

THE COURT: What is the APA claim, then, that you are stating?

Let's say for those of your clients who are actual citizens of the United States. What is the claim for relief, and what are its elements? Because I can't find them in your complaint.

MR. WIZNER: The -- the gravamen of the APA claim, your Honor, is that the Government's actions in preventing our clients from flying commercially and implicating various interests that we've identified, without at the same time providing them any kind of a fair process for getting out of that situation, is arbitrary and capricious.

And -- and that -- that is -- that's how our complaint sounds in ADA language. But it's --

THE COURT: In APA --

MR. WIZNER: Sorry. APA not ADA. That's exactly right.

And, again, ideally, your Honor, the result of this litigation, if the Court were to agree that the existing redress process is constitutionally inadequate, a process in which travelers are free to provide whatever information they want to the Government but are never told whether they are or are not on a list, are never given any reason whatsoever for why they may be on a list, there's no hearing before an administrative law judge — which was one of the factors that Chief Judge Kozinski mentioned in **Ibrahim** for why it needed to be in district court.

But if the Court were to agree that the existing redress process were unconstitutional, ideally the agency would respond by creating a process that met those constitutional minimums.

It may be that in this case, if the agency were slow to do that, that kind of process would take place here, in the district court. Where if the Court agreed that our clients had a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard on this deprivation, that a procedure could be established for our clients, in this court, to do that.

But we certainly don't disagree with the Government, that the agency should have a chance, in the first instance, to create a process that meets those constitutional safeguards, as they do in many, many other circumstances. If an alien is going to be removed from the country, there is a hearing before an administrative law judge. Sometimes there's secret evidence, sometimes there isn't. But there — there is a process that exists.

Here, we believe that the deprivation that our clients have suffered has constitutional significance. That their due process rights are being violated. And in those circumstances, the -- the redress process that the Government set up, that affords no notice, that sends the same letter to a complainant, whether that person is or is not on the No Fly List, they will get the same kind of letter. The only way they can find out if they're still on the list is by risking this injury again: The monetary and reputational harm of buying another plane ticket, going to an airport, being turned away.

We believe that's unconstitutional, and that under the due process clause, the agency is required to provide more process.

THE COURT: I'm still troubled that the complaint itself doesn't explicitly allege discrete claims for relief in an elemental way.

So back to my invitation to you to imagine you were

starting over. What would you allege? Do you have one claim for relief? Do you have more than one claim for relief? Do your clients, who have different statuses, have different claims? Why have you denominated pages 88, and on, in counts that are part of the same claim? If your — are you making an APA claim on its own? And these are different theories for the same argument about an arbitrary and capricious governmental agency action? Or do you have a separate stand-alone constitutional Fifth Amendment due process claim that you're making? In which case, I continue to think that's a claim that needs a vehicle, like a Section 1983 claim, or something.

You don't just throw constitutional language into a complaint. You need a vehicle for relief, and you need a basis to recover attorney fees, and so forth.

So tell me what -- what is the outline of your -- of the elements of your claim or claims? How many of them are there? How many of your plaintiffs fit under which one? So that I can try to understand what the Government's dismissal arguments are against your theories, framed that way.

MR. WIZNER: Your Honor, I think the case is simplified at this point because of the resolution of our claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Immigration and Nationality Acts, by virtue of the Government providing the relief that we requested, which was the repatriation of those clients, subject to suitable screening procedures.

And although the Government did, once again, press a defense against those claims in its Motion to Dismiss, it may very well be that those claims are moot. And that if we were to amend at this time with these plaintiffs, we would not be in a position to raise those claims. And that simplifies it because the remaining plaintiffs in the case are all making precisely the same claims.

THE COURT: Claim or claims?

MR. WIZNER: Claims.

THE COURT: All right. Delineate them, please.

MR. WIZNER: Yes. So they are making constitutional claims, a right to procedural due process under the Constitution. And if your Honor is correct, that we did not frame these through the appropriate jurisdictional vehicle --

THE COURT: I don't know or not.

I just don't see -- I don't see how the door's been opened. I just see a lot of allegations, and -- and a conclusion.

We all know, under **Iqbal** and otherwise, that the complaint has to be plausible. There have to be facts concisely stated that point to a right to recover some kind of relief.

And I can't start analyzing a Motion to Dismiss, except maybe the jurisdictional arguments. And I surely won't be able to get to all of these summary judgment arguments that

have been forced so quickly until -- until there is a defining of what is the precise claim, what are the precise claims, and what are their elements, such that I can look at this from an analytical perspective.

So I'm inviting you to tell me each claim that you think is either there explicitly or implicitly, and what are the elements of each such claim.

MR. WIZNER: Okay. So, your Honor, the -- the basis for the procedural due process claim is that our clients have identified various liberty interests, the deprivation of which trigger -- trigger a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. And I do think that we spelled out what those liberty interests were --

THE COURT: Yes. Yes, you have.

MR. WIZNER: -- properly in the complaint.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it's properly. But you've alleged that your clients have the liberty interests, including but not limited to the interests in traveling, freedom from false stigmatization, and nonattainder due to their inclusion.

MR. WIZNER: Right. And the relief that is requested through that claim is a process that -- as I've said like a broken record and I apologize -- affords them meaningful notice and --

THE COURT: Meaningful notice of what?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ WIZNER: Meaningful notice of the basis for the deprivation.

In short, they have a right to know why. And as your Honor is familiar, in other circumstances there may be procedures that are necessary. Maybe they'll get unclassified summaries of the evidence that the Government is relying upon.

It may not be that they get to open up the Government's files and see everything that's inside.

But, at a minimum, they need to know why the Government is not allowing them to fly. And they need to know that well enough so that they have an opportunity to say either, That's not me, That's not true, or I can explain that.

THE COURT: All right. That's one claim or more than one claim?

MR. WIZNER: No, it's one claim. It's a procedural due process claim.

THE COURT: Are there other claims?

MR. WIZNER: Yeah. There's an independent claim under the Administrative Procedure Act on the basis that the same challenged conduct is arbitrary and capricious and contrary to constitutional rights, which the APA permits.

THE COURT: All right. Are there any other claims that should have been explicitly laid out or are implicitly laid out here besides your procedural due process claim and the APA claim you've just identified?

MR. WIZNER: The only other claims that were laid out are ones that probably are not live at this stage of the litigation, for --

THE COURT: So for purposes of our discussion today, is it safe for me to assume we have two claims for relief on the table?

MR. WIZNER: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's talk about this procedural due process claim.

You're indicating that at the time one of your clients receives a red light at the airport, they've gone, they can't get their boarding pass, or they're pulled aside in screening or in some manner. They're not allowed simply to step through, to get to the gate, to get on an aircraft. Somewhere in that process, your clients are entitled to notice why they've been held aside, and an opportunity to respond?

MR. WIZNER: Correct. Before some kind of neutral decision maker.

And typically this would take place within the agency, but the agency has not yet set up a process that permits that.

THE COURT: And how does that contention of your presumed right -- your client's right to a hearing there or in some manner that allows them to -- to proceed with their otherwise fundamental right to travel, how does that compare to the specific process that the statute refers to as within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Court of 1 2 Appeals? 3 MR. WIZNER: Well --THE COURT: You're saying that when your client says, 4 Why, I'm entitled to know why, that whatever happens after that 5 is not in any way an order of the TSA that is subject to that 6 7 exclusive jurisdiction. MR. WIZNER: The question under that statute is 8 9 whether our clients have disclosed an interest in an order of 10 the TSA. 11 So the first question is what is that order. The --12 THE COURT: Is there an order? MR. WIZNER: Yeah. First of all, is there an order? 13 14 What is it that order might be? 15 The Government contends that that order is the letter 16 that is sent by an arm of TSA to our clients and others. 17 THE COURT: After the fact? 18 MR. WIZNER: After they have submitted applications 19 for administrative redress. 20 So the way that it occurs and the way that we 21 described in our complaint, is that someone who has been turned 22 away from a flight may then appeal to the Department of 23 Homeland Security for redress through a process that has been 24 set out. 25 Typically they'll go to a Government-run website.

And there they're invited to submit any information they want. The problem is they're not told what they should submit that evidence in response to, and they don't know what it's about.

All they know is that they weren't allowed to board a plane. They haven't been told whether or not they're on a watch list. They have to guess at that. And the Government says that the vast majority of people who in fact do turn to this mechanism are not on Government watch lists. But they have no way of knowing that. And they still don't know that after they get a response, because the letter says, We've reviewed this. If we should have taken an action, we did. And — and that's really all it says.

And so we submit that someone who receives one of those letters is in precisely the same position after he received it than he was in before he received it.

He either is or is not on a Government watch list. It takes no definitive position, as the law requires.

So the Government's argument is this case belongs in the Court of Appeals, because that letter is an order, and we should appeal from that order to the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: I think there's a precursor to that logic.

That the process that your clients are entitled to is the redress process. And from the redress process comes a decision in the form of this nondescript letter that itself can

then be appealed.

MR. WIZNER: It could be, your Honor.

The Government surely could have set this up differently; in a way that would make a letter like that an order.

But what they would have to do is set up a process where TSA was actually the decision maker. Where TSA had authority over the decision.

Where -- we believe, for it to be constitutional, where our clients had a chance to present evidence. Not just randomly, but in response to allegations. And then the letter would have to deliver the outcome. It would have to tell the person, This is our definitive statement of the legal question.

Now, the -- the question is, Can I fly or not? But as the Government's affidavits make clear, DHS trip letters do not take any position on whether the petitioner can or cannot fly.

And that's a categorical rule. They don't sometimes say you can fly and sometimes not. They simply don't say anything.

And so, again, someone at the end of this process, we believe, is in precisely the same situation he was in before.

If you look at the other cases interpreting that jurisdictional provision, it's -- it's -- it's a parachute club that's complaining that new FAA rules say they can't jump from where they want to jump. And can you imagine a letter from the

FAA that said, We've reviewed your complaint, and either you can jump or you can't. But — but really, for it to be equivalent here, that letter would have to come from an entity that really wasn't a decision maker.

So our belief is that **Ibrahim** is controlling precisely for the reason that it is a separate government entity, altogether, that is calling the shots.

THE COURT: So as you've explained your two operative claims to me this afternoon -- and I thank you for tolerating my persistence there -- as you've explained them, your argument is that the -- those claims cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because none of them -- neither of them implicate an order of the TSA that is being submitted for judicial review?

MR. WIZNER: That's correct, your Honor.

And we would go beyond that and say that the jurisdictional statute doesn't contemplate the kind of challenge that we're bringing to the validity of the existing redress process itself.

That -- that if you look at the language of the statute, what it contemplates is an appeal from that order; not an attack on that system.

And, you know, we believe under **Mace v. Skinner** and under **Ibrahim** that this case properly belongs in the district court.

I mean, one of the other points that Judge Kozinski made in **Ibrahim** is that shouldn't a case like this be in front of a court that can take evidence?

And we don't see how we can litigate our due process claims without evidence. It may be we can litigate some of them without discovery, but that's only because the parties are able to jointly stipulate to facts. The Court would still have to do fact-finding. And it may be that when we get to the individual situations of our clients that there will be discovery. And it's hard to imagine what the Court of Appeals, in the Ninth Circuit or the D.C. Circuit would do if presented with these claims. What kind of mechanisms it could set up.

I think that one way of looking at this is that, you know, the cases that belong in the D.C. Circuit are there — are those that involve, really, review of an administrative record, that allows the court simply to look at what has been produced and make its ruling.

And it's hard to see how if we filed this kind of complaint or a streamlined version of it, your Honor, in the Court of Appeals, that that court would be set up to resolve the kinds of constitutional issues that we've raised here.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate those orienting comments.

I think, now, I would like to hear the Government's argument in support of the Motion to Dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, in that context. And then, of course, you'll have a chance to speak again on that issue.

MR. WIZNER: Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Counsel.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. In our view, this case is different from **Ibrahim** because in that case essentially Ms. Ibrahim's claim was backward looking. It was looking backwards at the initial decision to place her on the No Fly List. And she explicitly disclaimed any challenge to the redress procedures that were available at that time.

In this case -- in this case, as Mr. Wizner's just explained the claims, they're forward looking. It's you've encountered this travel difficulty. And your next question is, I think this happened to me because I'm on a Government watch list. How do I get off?

And the answer to that question is there is a redress procedure currently available, administered by DHS and TSA, at Congress's explicit command. So that process, the DHA TRIP process, is essentially the gravamen of the plaintiffs' claims in this case.

In order for the Court to award the relief that they are seeking, they need to persuade your Honor that the DHS TRIP process is itself deficient and unlawful. And TSA is the entity that is charged with providing redress to persons who

allege that they were delayed or denied boarding.

And when they issue -- so Mr. Wizner's correct that individuals who encounter travel difficulties of any kind -- and that's part of the reason DHS TRIP is described as a central processing point. So you may have been denied boarding. A T -- TSA employee may have been rude to you. You may have lost your bags. Any of those situations, you're directed to file a complaint with DHS TRIP, and it will essentially investigate your complaint.

Now, the Government's never contended, your Honor, that this process is entirely TSA, entirely DHS. It does involve other agencies, but it doesn't change the fact that even though TSA's letter may be in part based on the work of other agencies, the letter itself is still a final order.

The plaintiffs don't --

THE COURT: How? How is the letter a final order?

MS. KELLEHER: I would say, your Honor, that it
expresses that the complaint has been finally resolved. That
to the extent action can be taken, it was. There's nothing
further left to do.

The letter is very different than those that are involved in the cases cited in the plaintiffs' brief, such as in **Air California**, or in the **Bensenville Village** case out of the D.C. Circuit. In those cases, in **Air California**, you had a letter from the FAA to the Orange County board of supervisors

that says, If you do not open up the John Wayne airport to other carriers, we may take the following types of disciplinary action against you. So there was an if. It was contingent on further action.

In the Village of Bensenville case, you had a letter of intent from the FAA suggesting, hey, maybe we'll have some additional federal funds as you expand the O'Hare airport for an eight runway. But we're not committing to those funds, and basically this is just a way for you to get some private development money to assist with your airport expansion.

So there was no commitment. And the essentially the real commitment would have come much later in the process, when the city of Chicago would have actually applied for that funding.

So in both of those cases, there was a clear sense that there was still further action to be taken, and that the agency's position was conditional, it was tentative, it was nonfinal. These letters — the DHS letters, while I certainly concede they do not contain as much information as Mr. Wizner thinks they should, there is nothing tentative and there is nothing conditional about them. They tell the complainant that their case has been reviewed. That there is an administrative record that says records have been reviewed. So this DHS TRIP process is very distinct from the concern that Judge Kozinski articulated in **Ibrahim**, because there is an administrative

record.

And in fact, your Honor, the Government filed an example of the certified index of record from the **Kataroff** (phonetic) case, which is currently pending in the D.C. Circuit. Where Mr. Kataroff received a TRIP letter, waited for the 60 days for it to become final, and filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit. And the Government has then come forward with the record that will support its decision.

So in that sense we clearly have that record, which is the basis for the agency's action. And the letter itself says that a final -- the complaint has been finally resolved.

So I think if you have a record and you have the agency's expression of finality, of a finding, that is a final order of TSA.

And the claims that Mr. Wizner and his clients wish to bring about the TRIP process, generally, I think they would be entirely appropriate in the Court of Appeals.

In the **Gilmore** case, Mr. **Gilmore** was very unhappy about the requirement that he show identification in order to travel from California to Washington.

And he also was unhappy about the -- the sort of plan B in that situation, which was for him to go through secondary screening.

He didn't like either of those options, and he sued essentially saying that he thought they were unlawful.

The Ninth Circuit held that this was a challenge to the final order of TSA, the directive that identification be required, absent an agreement to secondary screening. But it also entertained his due process, his vagueness, and his overbreadth challenges to those same security directives.

So I think in that --

THE COURT: Just because the Court of Appeals entertained them, didn't mean another court couldn't.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not sure that helps me in sorting through your jurisdictional argument, which is this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction at all.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. I should phrase it in terms of its relationship to the final order.

That essentially if this case really boils down to a claim, DHS TRIP is inadequate. It's not good enough. It doesn't tell us what we want to know. It doesn't give us enough transparency. We want a chance to be -- we want this process brought forward, to be more transparent and open.

Essentially, they wrote -- the letter should say more, and the process should be more open to them. Those to me seem they are -- they are tied to this letter that they get, which is the consummation of the current redress process.

THE COURT: And this differs from Chief Judge Kozinski's analysis in **Ibrahim** how?

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. I'll do my best to distinguish it.

At first I'd say that in **Ibrahim**, what the Ninth Circuit said was that the district court retained original jurisdiction over **Ibrahim**'s claim regarding placement on the No Fly List. So I would say this is not really, as Mr. Wizner just explained, a claim about incorrect placement. It's a claim about inadequate redress procedures. So I would say that's a first distinction.

Second, redress is specifically an obligation that Congress has given to TSA and DHS. And although --

THE COURT: Is there something different between the redress opportunity that is the subject of the statute and the due process rights the plaintiffs are seeking to vindicate here?

MS. KELLEHER: No, your Honor. I think essentially,
DHS TRIP is designed, at this point, to be the Government's
attempt to balance an individual's interests in traveling with
the Government's right to pre-screen passengers who wish to
board commercial aircrafts either in, to, or from the United
States.

So that -- the DHS TRIP process is designed to balance those interests and it's administered by TSA. And although it involves other agencies, we certainly don't deny that.

We've never said it was a 100 percent TSA process, and

in fact I think that would actually be in contravention of how Congress has asked for prescreening to occur.

We have set up the centralized watch lists to encourage information sharing among our executive branch agencies, and it would really make no sense for TSA to ignore the conclusions or work of another agency simply to restart its own work.

So essentially when --

THE COURT: But if there is a part of process then, in an agency other that TSA -- which is the subject of the limited jurisdiction statute --

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If there's a part of a process involving a different agency, how could that jurisdictional limitation be interpreted to preclude judicial review of that other agency's activities?

MS. KELLEHER: I wouldn't say that it would essentially preclude it, your Honor. It would simply --

THE COURT: By a regular old district court?

MS. KELLEHER: By a regular old district court; where I am always, your Honor. Unlike Mr. Wizner, we have a civil appellate staff. So I actually never get to go to the appellate courts.

But I would say in that case, your Honor, the work -- the other -- the involvement of the other agencies, then, just

becomes part of that process.

Essentially, the TSA letter, at the end, is the consummation of the person's attempt to get redress. And it involves TSA, TSC, and other agencies.

But the letter is sort of the ultimate outcome of that process.

And I don't think TSA's just sort of the bureaucratic messenger. Because, first of all, they're part of the process as well. But, second, it's ultimately TSA that if you're on the No Fly List — and as your Honor knows, we don't confirm or deny whether anyone is on the list. But if someone is on the list, they seek redress and they're successful, the decision is made to remove them from the list. They'll receive a letter from TSA which won't actually tell them that, but behind the scenes TSA will then remove them based on the TSA secure fly database. They will now be able to obtain a boarding pass.

THE COURT: Whose decision is that?

MS. KELLEHER: I think it's ultimately -- it's TSA's decision, based on the work of other agencies and TSA.

I think it's sort of this entire process of information sharing that goes on. And TSA essentially includes that decision when it communicates it to the individual. And it's also reflected, to the extent the person is successful --

THE COURT: What was it Chief Judge Kozinski was saying, then, in reversing the district judge on the

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jurisdictional question in Ibrahim? What was it he was saying the district court had jurisdiction to determine? MS. KELLEHER: He said that -- I believe I had -- the precise quote is, Her APA claim regarding placement of her name on the No Fly List. So in this case we would say we're distinct. continuum that your Honor referred to earlier, this is essentially a forward-looking claim as, this has happened to I've had this travel difficulty. I would like to have this not happen again. I would like to get off this list that I think I'm on. Ms. Ibrahim's essentially was a backward-looking claim which is nobody should have put me there in the first place. THE COURT: What is the status of the **Ibrahim** case? MS. KELLEHER: I believe, your Honor, it is as Mr. Wizner has suggested. It is a somewhat protracted case. But I believe Ms. Ibrahim is still currently appealing the district court's decision to dismiss the federal defendants on standing. So I think that is the live issue in the Ninth Circuit. I don't precisely know what's going on in the --THE COURT REPORTER: I need you to speak slower, please.

THE COURT: Way slower.

MS. KELLEHER: I apologize. It's a bad habit.

I believe the orders on discovery were vacated. 1 2 they're no longer live. And then the other defendants settled 3 out. THE COURT: But we don't know, yet, whether there will 4 5 be review of Chief Judge Kozinski's authored panel decision? MS. KELLEHER: I think that decision is final, your 6 7 Honor. I believe the Government sought en banc but was not 8 successful. 9 So essentially --10 THE COURT: But when the case is back before the 11 appellate court after a final decision, are you saying the 12 Government has foreclosed the opportunity to appeal that decision? 13 14 MS. KELLEHER: You know, I am uncertain, your Honor. Perhaps --15 16 THE COURT: Probably you don't want to say that one 17 way or the other. 18 I'm trying to understand how final that decision is. 19 Clearly it is a published decision, and I am bound by it. I'm 20 also trying to understand what it means, to apply it here. 21 But --22 MS. KELLEHER: I think when --23 THE COURT: Your view is that it's -- it is not in 24 play anymore? 25 MS. KELLEHER: That's my understanding. And I believe

when the Ninth Circuit takes up the issue that was remaining, it had to do with her standing, essentially. And so it was limited to whether or not she had sufficiently discussed future plans, and that sort of thing.

But I don't -- I don't think this part of the **Ibrahim** case -- at least as we understand it -- is still in play.

So we would argue essentially, your Honor, that we're -- since we're on the redress side and there's a specific obligation for TSA, and we know from the records -- from the DHS TRIP letters and the declarations we've submitted to your Honor, there is an administrative record.

So Chief Judge Kozinski's concern that the appellate court would be sort of at sea in trying to address the merits of — review the merits of a decision is unfounded here, not only because the DHS TRIP letters say there's a record but because we've even submitted to your Honor an index of such a record in a case involving a petition for review of a DHS TRIP letter. The **Kataroff** case in the D.C. Circuit.

So the plaintiffs have a number of suggestions. That because there may be multiple agencies involved, a petitioner might be left with no grounds to really -- the appellate court would be left with no grounds to review the decision. But ultimately the Government would come forward with a record to justify its conduct and its decision in the matter, just --

THE COURT: Or not.

MS. KELLEHER: Or not. And simply -- if not, take the risk that the petition would be granted.

But in the **Kataroff** case, which -- where he received -- Mr. Kataroff received a letter identical to some of the letters that the plaintiff -- the Latif plaintiffs have received, the certified index of record has been filed. It lists over 100 things. And the parties will be free to -- to get into the merits of -- of that petition before the D.C. Circuit.

THE COURT: All right. So in summary, the Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted because?

MS. KELLEHER: DHS TRIP is a redress process that is specifically within TSA's statutory obligations.

It -- the DHS TRIP letters that are sent out are final orders of the TSA, because they definitively resolve the DHS TRIP complaint, and they are based on an administrative record related to review of that complaint.

THE COURT: Is there a time limit for a traveler to challenge a DHS TRIP letter?

MS. KELLEHER: I believe it's 60 days, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is there a time issue in this case, relative to the filing of the complaint and those -- such issues?

For example, if theoretically this action was

dismissed on the subject matter jurisdiction grounds you were 1 2 asserting, would that in fact leave the plaintiffs without any 3 review? MS. KELLEHER: You know, I don't know, your Honor. 4 5 haven't compared the filing of the initial complaint of June 30th of 2010 with the dates that the plaintiffs all received 6 7 their TRIP letters. 8 I know that when the complaint was filed, some but not 9 all of the plaintiffs had received their TRIP letters. 10 received them after --11 THE COURT: After the --12 MS. KELLEHER: After the filing. So I would think 13 there would probably be a tolling argument, which might be available while this action was pending, but I don't know, your 14 15 Honor. I haven't compared the dates. 16 THE COURT: All right. Then on that Motion to Dismiss 17 single ground -- are you finished? I'm sorry, Counsel. 18 MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Counsel. 20 Thanks, your Honor. Just a few points. MR. WIZNER: 21 Your Honor asked an extremely important question: 22 Whose decision is it? 23 And the answer to that is found in the Government's

own declarations, in the Piehota declaration. Mr. Piehota is with the Terrorist Screening Center.

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He says --

2 THE COURT: Would you spell that name, please.

3 MR. WIZNER: PIEHOTA.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WIZNER: There are two declarations from

Mr. Piehota. I'm referring to the first one.

He said that the Terrorist Screening Center, the defendant in this case, is the final arbiter of an individual's watch list status.

It may well be that there are other agencies that participate in this process. But it's the Terrorist Screening Center that is the final arbiter. It decides if you're put on the list. It decides if you can be taken off the list. It transmits that information to other agencies that enforce it. But it's the Terrorist Screening Center that is the ultimate decision maker in this case. And that's not me saying that. That's the Government saying that in a sworn declaration.

Ms. Kelleher distinguished this case from **Ibrahim** by saying that **Ibrahim** was backward-looking and this case is forward-looking. But in fact, as the Court of Appeals described Ms. Ibrahim's complaint, she sought — and I'm quoting — an injunction to remove her name from the No Fly List. So there certainly was some prospective injunctive relief that was sought in that case.

And I -- although I do think it is possible to

distinguish this case from **Ibrahim**, if one is determined to do so, I don't think that Judge Kozinski would expect this case to be filed in the Court of Appeals after his decision.

In describing the DHS TRIP letters, Ms. Kelleher stated why she believes that those letters are a definitive statement of the agency's position, even if they don't communicate that result to the complainant herself.

But I would say again that -- that in no case that the defendant cited, or that I have located anywhere, has a letter been determined to be an order. If it was written by an entity that didn't have the --

THE COURT: The judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did, didn't he?

MR. WIZNER: Except for the Scherfen case.

THE COURT: Well, don't say no case.

MR. WIZNER: I shouldn't say no case. In the **Scherfen** case, the judge in that case was persuaded by the dissent in **Ibrahim**. You are right.

THE COURT: I am simply trying to be sure I had correctly read that case. Because when a lawyer tells me no case, and I remember one that might be within the no-case universe, I wanted to be sure I didn't remember it wrong.

MR. WIZNER: It's one of my New Year's resolutions to be more precise in my language, your Honor, so thank you.

THE COURT: So other than that case.

MR. WIZNER: Other than that. And moreover, again,
DHS has described itself as primarily a consumer of watch lists
information. That that's not the language of an entity that is
the decision maker here.

THE COURT: Now, I'm sorry. Which entity is the consumer?

MR. WIZNER: The Department of Homeland Security, of which TSA is a part.

That really is the TSC, which is operated by the F.B.I., that is the decision maker. And it's the Department of Homeland Security and the TSA -- and we cite to this in our brief -- where they've described themselves as a consumer of this.

If the Court were to determine that a DHS TRIP letter actually is an order -- although we believe that it doesn't meet the test for an order under the case law construing 46110. But if the Court determines that it is an order, we would submit that under **Ibrahim**, it's an order of the TSC and not an order of the TSA, for the reasons I stated.

Ms. Kelleher again rightly pointed to the -- to the fact that Congress has attempted to assign responsibility for redress to DHS and to the TSA.

But I would just point out that the Government made precisely that observation and argument to the Court of Appeals in **Ibrahim**.

And, in fact, I looked at the Government's brief in that case. It's at 2007 Westlaw 1511928, at pages 13 and 14.

The Government made that argument, that although TSC may be mostly responsible, TSA is involved, other agencies are involved as well. And Congress said that TSA had responsibility.

The majority of the Court of Appeals rejected the argument in that case. Judge Smith, in dissent, essentially formed his dissent around that very argument.

So I don't think that it's open to the Government to press that argument or for the Court to rule on that basis.

THE COURT: May I interrupt you there and ask for Ms. Kelleher's thoughts on that particular point.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor.

In that, I would say that in **Ibrahim** the Government was relying on the TSA's general responsibilities for aviation security, whereas here we have a specific statute that Congress has told TSA to establish a procedure to enable airline passengers who are delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight because the advanced passenger prescreening system determined that they might pose a security threat, to appeal such determination and correct information —

THE COURT: What are you quoting from?

MS. KELLEHER: That is 49 USC --

THE COURT: 49 USC.

MS. KELLEHER: 44903.

And so I would say here we have an incredibly specific statute that is essentially right on point with the claims as alleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint.

And in **Ibrahim** there was a -- the argument was more about the general responsibilities of TSA for aviation security, and the fact that they, at that point, transmitted the No Fly List to the airlines.

THE COURT: And while you're on your feet,

Mr. Wizner's point that **Ibrahim** also involved a request that
she be removed from the No Fly List, and he was distinguishing
your argument about backward-looking/forward-looking based on
that additional remedy she was seeking.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. She -- she did seek injunctive relief. I think had she only sought damages, she would have needed to go to the Court of Claims. So her requested relief was removal from the list. But her requested relief was not a reevaluation of the existing redress process.

And -- and more to the point in **Ibrahim**, there were no DHS TRIP letters sent to Ms. **Ibrahim**.

Essentially the argument about TSA's responsibility stemmed from their general obligation to ensure the safety and security of our nation's aircrafts.

Here we not only have 49 USC 44903, a specific statute, but we have specific DHS TRIP letters that were sent

to all of the plaintiffs. 1 2 So that's where I would make -- see --3 THE COURT: So the Government's position is, in short, the process the plaintiffs are due is encapsulated in the DHS 4 5 TRIP process? 6 MS. KELLEHER: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: And, by statute, the only redress from 7 8 that, if they're not satisfied with the process, is to go to 9 the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia? 10 MS. KELLEHER: Exactly, your Honor. To take their DHS 11 TRIP letter. And to the extent they would like to argue that 12 not only was whatever outcome from the redress either justified 13 or not justified, but that the entire process itself, as 14 Mr. Gilmore argued in his case to the identification 15 requirements, that the process is not sufficiently transparent 16 and does not comport with due process. They're free to make 17 those arguments --18 THE COURT: Did the Ninth Circuit send Mr. Gilmore 19 there to do that? MS. KELLEHER: They did, your Honor. I don't think he 20 21 met with success on those claims, but they did entertain them, 22 as -- that they were inextricably intertwined with his 23 challenge to --

THE COURT: Well, we know what Judge Kozinski thinks about that language, so we're not going to use that as an

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argument.

MS. KELLEHER: Yes. And he did, I think, try to sort of save the **Gilmore** case by saying that the issue was that inextricably intertwined is acceptable when you're talking about the claims that are being put forth by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: As opposed to something that might be intertwined with an order, whatever that is?

MS. KELLEHER: Exactly. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Mr. Wizner, I interrupted you, and I appreciate the indulgence.

MR. WIZNER: I'm almost finished, your Honor.

But just to respond to the point about Congress. You know, this case challenges the redress system that exists, not the one that Congress said should exist.

And it may be that Congress contemplated TSA having a larger role, where TSA could -- in the words Ms. Kelleher used -- correct any errors.

But the only correction that TSA is doing is at the instruction of the entity that actually has decision making authority.

It wasn't Congress that dictated that the Terrorist Screening Center should be responsible. That was a decision of the executive branch, to -- to assign responsibility among the various agencies and entities that are responsible for this.

Congress may very well have wished for a different

arrangement, but we are challenging the process as set forth in 1 the declarations of the defendants. That's process that 2 3 exists, and the statutory language doesn't change that. And finally, your Honor, about petitioning the Court 4 5 of Appeals, what --THE COURT: For the District of Columbia. 6 7 MR. WIZNER: Well, I -- is it only the District of 8 Columbia, or could it be any court of appeals now? 9 MS. KELLEHER: I think, your Honor, the plaintiff must 10 be present, which is why Mr. Gilmore was in the Ninth Circuit, 11 the San Diego helicopter --12 THE COURT: I must have misread that. I thought it 13 was one of those limited courts of appeal. 14 MS. KELLEHER: I believe it's essentially where the 15 petitioner resides. MR. WIZNER: So it would be --16 17 THE COURT: You're going to endear me to those 18 colleagues yet one more time. 19 MR. WIZNER: Well, better than sending me to their 20 colleagues in the D.C. Circuit. THE COURT: Thank you for correcting me. 21 22 MR. WIZNER: But, again, about -- about that petition 23 to the Court of Appeals, who exactly should invoke the Court of 24 Appeals' jurisdiction? 25 Under the current system, the answer would have to be

everyone who has gone through DHS TRIP. Because even if, as they say, more than 90 percent of the people who submit those petitions were never on watch lists in the first place and even if some other percentage of those people were successful in their petition for redress, they would have no way of knowing that, because they're going to get the same or substantially the same letter from TSA that says we either did or didn't take any action in this case.

You would then have thousands of petitions to the Court of Appeals saying, I either am or I'm not on the No Fly List. I haven't been given any evidence. I haven't seen any record.

And I -- again, in none of the cases that are construing this jurisdictional statute or its predecessor did you have a situation where the putative order in question did not state the agency's position in a way that would allow the petitioner to know even whether to appeal, leaving aside what to appeal.

So at a minimum -- at a bare, bare minimum -- the petitioner should know whether their administrative redress has been successful.

We contend that the Constitution requires considerably more than that. They would need to have some basis for knowing what it is that they're challenging.

And this record, that goes to the Court of Appeals,

are a bunch of documents assembled by the Government alone.

And I suppose anything that the petitioner wants to submit -but, again, in response to nothing; not knowing why the

Government has placed him in that position.

So I do think that certainly there's no case other than **Scherfen**, that has been cited to this Court, in which this kind of scheme has constituted a final order that is appealable exclusively to the Court of Appeals.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's take about a ten-minute break. And then we'll focus on this motion to -- Motion to Strike and next steps.

I want the parties to know that, as I indicated in our earlier telephone conferences, I have not reviewed, looked at, or considered in any way any of the ex parte materials that have been submitted.

They went into a safe place, a SKIF. And they're sitting there, and they remain there. So to the extent I've been arguing with you today or considering your arguments, it's based only on the -- the legal assertions. And if there comes a time when, in the processing of this Motion to Strike, you come to a place where you expect me to be looking at those things, then we'll change that status.

But right now, I'm still in the "I haven't looked at them yet" part. So I want to be sure you're all aware of that.

Okay. Ten minutes, please. 1 2 (Recess taken.) 3 THE COURT: Mr. Wizner, I would like to go back to Ibrahim, if you don't mind. 4 MR. WIZNER: I don't mind, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: And if you have a copy of the case, the 6 7 actual case? 8 MR. WIZNER: I do, your Honor (indicating). 9 THE COURT: All right. I can orient you best by 10 referring to headnote numbers. 11 In -- under headnote 1, before you get to headnote 2, 12 before -- before footnote 9. In fact the sentence that's 13 immediately preceding the flag for footnote 9. 14 The -- that reads, quote: The No Fly List is 15 maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, and 16 Section 46110 doesn't apply to that agency's 17 actions. The district court therefore retains 18 original jurisdiction over Ibrahim's APA claim, 19 regarding placement of her name on the No Fly List, 20 pursuant to 28 USC Section 1331. 21 All right. See that statement? 22 And then in several lines, under headnote 2, is the 23 concluding sentence of that paragraph B, which is captioned, 24 "Policies and Procedures Implementing the No Fly List." 25 That concluding sentence reads, Therefore, Section

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46110 stripped the district court of jurisdiction
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              it would otherwise have had over Ibrahim's APA
              claim regarding the Government's policies and
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              procedures implementing the No Fly List.
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              MR. WIZNER: I think that's a typo, your Honor.
     think that the Court meant to -- meant Gilmore's, in context.
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              (Pause, referring.)
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              MR. WIZNER: Or maybe not. No.
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              THE COURT: I don't think it's a typo.
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              MR. WIZNER: No, maybe not.
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              THE COURT: Here's what I'm thinking.
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              MR. WIZNER: Let me read this.
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              (Pause, referring.)
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              THE COURT: I think those are two distillations of the
     spectrum of jurisdiction, at least in the Ninth Circuit and as
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     to which I'm beholden.
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              I propose -- what -- what I'm having difficulty with
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     is what I began the afternoon with, and that is trying to sort
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     out precisely from the record that has been superseded by
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     events, specifically the plaintiffs' complaint, what part of
     plaintiffs' -- now -- two claims that are really of concern may
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     involve placement of their names on the No Fly List. In which
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     case, Judge Kozinski says clearly Section 46110 doesn't apply.
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              And which parts of plaintiffs' claims involve the
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     Government's policies and procedures implementing the No Fly
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List, in which case I don't have jurisdiction.

And what I'm suggesting --

MR. WIZNER: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: -- is this. I think the plaintiffs should file an amended complaint, especially with these two standards -- opposing standards in mind. So that I can tell exactly what the claims are that plaintiffs are asserting, and I can seek to apply binding Ninth Circuit precedent under also the Rule 12 standards of Iqbal and the Rule of Procedure 8, and come to a decision about whether plaintiffs' claims do or do not fall at one end or the other of this jurisdictional continuum.

And in that process I think I will be better able to determine if I am dealing with an order of the TSA or something else.

These -- these standards, from Judge Kozinski's analysis, have to be squared with the plaintiffs' allegations. They're two declaratory sentences about whether the district court does or doesn't have jurisdiction.

And I'm not suggesting you plead them, but I'm saying that they are real articulations the Court will have to take into account in evaluating whether I have jurisdiction or I do not have jurisdiction. Whether your arguments about due process, in other words, are in fact arguments about policies and procedures implementing the fly list, such that I don't

have jurisdiction to consider your complaints on your client's behalf; or whether your arguments about due process are more in the nature of placing or removing names from the No Fly List, such that a -- aligned with Judge Kozinski's decision there, the matter was to be developed by the trial court.

Do you see what I'm saying?

MR. WIZNER: I do, your Honor. And I would just say that I think -- I read this to mean something slightly different.

That Judge Kozinski is not necessarily being as precise as you are about the distinction between placement and removal. I think that he's referring to a watch list status.

THE COURT: Well, what I'm seeing very precisely, however, is that he explicitly said the district court would not have jurisdiction over claims regarding the Government's policies and procedures implementing the No Fly List. And the way you've been arguing about process and the redress system seems driftingly close to that.

MR. WIZNER: I don't think so, your Honor.

Respectfully, I think that the policies and practices implementing --

THE COURT: This is why I'm giving you a chance to file an amended complaint, to be explicit about what claim actually is being advanced, and pleaded in a way that can be clear from the face of the complaint in a concise way.

I can then make a determination as a matter of law, from the face of the complaint, as to whether Section 46110 closes the door for your clients in this court or not. I think that needs to happen, in lieu of my ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

MR. WIZNER: We're very willing to file an amended complete.

THE COURT: I wouldn't snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, if I were you.

You're trying hard to articulate a place where your claims survive in the district court. And I'm having an ongoing problem holding onto that, because it is an illusive kind of argument, when I go back to the complaint and I try to evaluate what you're telling me in the face of the allegations of the complaint. It is the complaint that is the operative document. It is a Motion to Dismiss that complaint on jurisdictional grounds. And the very first obstacle that has to be addressed in a principled way is the Ibrahim decision, and the Court's declarations about what the district court did have power to do and didn't have power to do.

And I think the plaintiffs need to face up to that and plead concisely what it is that they contend brings them within the district court's jurisdiction and pleads away from a claim that involves policies and procedures implementing the No Fly List. Because that's what I think Judge Kozinski clearly said

was one basis for the court not to have power to proceed.

So willingness isn't really an option. You may not want me to rule on this motion on this record.

MR. WIZNER: Right. I am not actually trying to snatch defeat from the jaws of anything. I just want to be clear about what it is that we need to plead when we --

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what you need to plead, because I don't know what you're pleading.

I continue --

MR. WIZNER: Right.

THE COURT: $\--$ to be challenged, as I know all of us are, by where the line is.

But jurisdiction comes first, and I have to be able to articulate that there is a claim. I have the authority to require the defendants to answer in this Court. At least to the next step.

And I can't principally -- I can't do that in a principled way, based on the complaint that I have and based on these particular references to **Ibrahim**, which I'm bound to follow.

MR. WIZNER: Right.

THE COURT: And so I think what plaintiffs need to do is to file a new complaint.

You could, for example, withdraw without prejudice those claims you think aren't any longer necessary or not.

But whatever it is you do, it needs to be not 90 pages worth of evidence but an articulation of the specific two claims, or more, that you want to parse out within -- among other things -- these two standards.

MR. WIZNER: I -- I understand, your Honor. What we

MR. WIZNER: I -- I understand, your Honor. What we have difficulty with is that we don't know what the Court is referring to when it uses the term "policies and procedures."

And the reason why we don't know that is that if you look at footnote 10, Judge Kozinski writes:

The precise policies and procedures are not known to **Ibrahim** or to us, because the security directive -- directive is sensitive security information.

So --

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter that you don't know.

MR. WIZNER: No, it does, though.

THE COURT: All we know for sure is that if the claim involves policies and procedures implementing the No Fly List, it's a no-go here. That's what we know from this case.

I do not have the power to let you go forward if your claim comes within that ambit. That's what this says.

MR. WIZNER: Right. And what I think is significant about this footnote is that it gives us a frame for what is meant by the term "policies and procedures," that distinguishes

it.

THE COURT: And I'm inviting you to articulate your claim in a way that excludes the proximity of your argument from that -- that line, which you cannot cross.

Because if we are in a claim about policies and procedures implementing the No Fly List, if in fact the redress process is a policy and procedure implementing the No Fly List, then the district court doesn't have jurisdiction, and that's the end of your case here.

If you have a claim that's different than a claim regarding policies and procedures implementing the No Fly List, you need to articulate it in a way that makes clear I have jurisdiction.

And I think part of the process is simply to boil it down to your contention that it is the TSC. You simply make the allegation of the ultimate fact. The TSC is the decision maker that includes your clients on the list, if they're on the list. They do that without notice, without process, and without an opportunity. I don't know what your claim is.

MR. WIZNER: Well, that is actually in our complaint, what you just recited.

THE COURT: Well, in 90 pages, I say again with respect -- now, I'm not going to argue with you, Counsel. If you don't want an opportunity to amend, fine. I'll rule on the record. But I can tell you you are not making it any easier

for this claim to go beyond a dismissal.

It is extraordinarily difficult to take what you're arguing in theory and apply it to the standard from this document.

Now, do you want an opportunity or not?

MR. WIZNER: We do, and we will.

Again, I do think that we're going to have a difficulty, only insofar as because the policies and procedures are sensitive security information. We don't know what they are.

THE COURT: Look, if you want to litigate in the district court, you have to articulate a claim that is outside the ambit of Section 46110, in a concise way, consistent with Rule 8, and in a manner that allows me to process the claim despite **Ibrahim**.

Your current complaint does not affirmatively make that clear.

It is your obligation, as the pleading party, to show I have jurisdiction. You haven't.

Now, if you want an opportunity to do it, you may have it, and I won't formally rule on the motion. That's really where we are.

A party needs to make clear the jurisdictional basis of his, her, or their claim.

You have a very difficult problem, given the nature of

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THE COURT:

this serious dispute, but you have to articulate it. throwing 90 pages of evidence, with conclusions, doesn't do it in this circuit. So take your pick. I'll take the Motion to Dismiss under advisement. Or, instead of that, I'll give you an opportunity to replead and give the Government a brief opportunity to file a supplemental memorandum in support of a Motion to Dismiss, against a repled complaint, with a reply 9 opportunity by you. Those are our routes on the Motion to Dismiss part of that big omnibus motion you filed. How do you want to proceed? MR. WIZNER: We accept your invitation, your Honor, to file an amended complaint. THE COURT: How much time do you want to do that? 15 Today is the 21st of January. 17 Two weeks will be sufficient, your Honor. MR. WIZNER: THE COURT: And how much time would the Government want to file a supplemental memorandum in further support of the jurisdictional aspect of the motion? MS. KELLEHER: Could your Honor remind me? 22 have my calendar in front of me. Where that -- the two weeks 23 from --

Two weeks from today is February 4.

MS. KELLEHER: I think two weeks would be fine, your

Honor.

THE COURT: February 18th.

And then a reply. Do you want one week, two weeks?

MR. WIZNER: Two weeks, please, your Honor.

THE COURT: March 4.

So with respect -- excuse me just a moment.

(Pause, referring.)

THE COURT: To that part of Motion No. 43, which is a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court defers ruling on the motion pending the filing of a Second Amended Complaint by the plaintiffs, no later than February 4; which complies with Rule 8 and which sets forth the -- clearly, the nature of the claims proposed and a jurisdictional basis for the claims in light of the jurisdictional challenge under Section 46110.

I want -- I want you to do what you can to articulate how a claim or claims -- your APA claim, your due process claim, whatever claims you're going to proceed with, fit a district court jurisdictional analysis in light of Section 46110 as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, because that's where you chose to sue. Okay? February 4.

Supplemental memorandum, in further support of that part of Document 43, that is a jurisdictional motion to dismiss, is due February 18; a reply, March 4. And I will take that part of the motion under advisement on March 4, without

any additional oral argument.

Now, was there something else on that you wanted to talk about?

MR. WIZNER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about this Motion to Strike, and whether it has status now or not.

I was a bit confused by the correspondence you sent.

I'm not sure it really resolves anything.

Who wants to talk to me about that?

MS. CHOUDHURY: Your Honor, I'm happy to address that issue. Apologies if there was anything confusing in the parties' joint letter.

THE COURT: Well, what it sounded like to me was we don't really need to you rule on the Motion to Strike, so long as you can rule on the Motion for Summary Judgment without looking at any of those materials.

But if you want to look at those materials, you could, because we think we win the Motion for Summary Judgment anyway, regardless of what's in those materials.

Which sounded to me like a pretty circular argument.

And if -- if people really don't care about those materials, either withdraw them -- withdraw them. If you care about them, then they need to be dealt with appropriately in the record.

So I'm -- I am confused about what it is the status is

of the Motion to Strike.

MS. CHOUDHURY: Your Honor, the defendants' opposition to that motion provided some of the first characterizations of what's in the ex parte material. So it changed the plaintiffs' position with respect to our understanding of what's in them and their potential impact on the -- what will be, if the Court proceeds past a Motion to Dismiss stage, cross-motions for summary judgment in this case.

Plaintiffs believe that even if the Court looks at the ex parte materials, that there is a chance that we will -- and we are confident that we will prevail on those cross-motions for summary judgment.

And in speaking and conferring with the defendants, it appeared clear from their opposition, as well as during our conversations, that they're -- they're confident as well, that if the Court does not review the submissions, that they may prevail as well.

THE COURT: So are you withdrawing the Motion to Strike?

MS. CHOUDHURY: At this point, your Honor, no, we are not withdrawing.

What we would like the Court to do is to proceed -you know, assuming, of course, that the Court proceeds past the
Motion to Dismiss, with the cross-motions for summary judgment
and to review those motions, to look at them. And if the Court

deems that something in the ex parte materials is material and dispositive of those motions, to then schedule a status conference, so that we may address whether or not there are issues, due process concerns that we raise in our motion and would then address at that time.

Your Honor, in conferring with our clients, we, you know, consulted with them and are very concerned that orders issued in response to the motion to resolve some of the issues that may not in fact be material, when the Court looks at the Motions for Summary Judgment, may be the subject of interlocutory appeals.

THE COURT: Here's what I think we need to do.

The summary judgment record either needs to be considered by the Court on the same playing field for everyone to its logical conclusion, or not.

If the Government is satisfied that the summary judgment record it's made, without reference to ex parte materials, is sufficient to allow it to obtain summary judgment, that's the record we should use. Then the plaintiffs are not at any disadvantage. Plaintiffs have exactly the same information as do defendants and the Court. And the Court isn't colored in any way, even inferentially, by reference to material that the plaintiffs haven't been able to consider.

It's only if, going through that process, the defendants would contend more information might change the

analysis, that it would seem to be warranted to go into the process of dealing with protected information.

I've been frustrated, because I think you all have complicated the procedures in this case significantly by rushing into a combined Motion to Dismiss and for summary judgment before we've even settled on, as noted, the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint.

So I think we're a bit of a cart before the horse here, since I still don't even know if I have jurisdiction.

But with respect to the summary judgment part of

Motion 43, I don't know if the Government thinks that's still a

viable motion on the record it presented, because you all

haven't yet responded, or not.

This is the problem with charging forward on multiple fronts before things settle.

So I don't think it is at all appropriate to leave it to the Court to decide unilaterally whether something's important or not, because there are very significant interests at stake here for everyone.

And if -- it ought to be the party who wants the Court to consider the material, who makes the case that it's necessary to do that.

So my strong preference is for the moving party to decide whether that material's necessary or not. If it's not, then we shouldn't have a problem. We should all be able to

deal with the same record.

If it is, then we need yet another process to get in the middle of the merits here, and that's a process to deal with the process.

Counsel.

MS. POWELL: To be very clear about the Government's position, we do think we can prevail on the public record as it is, recognizing that the plaintiffs disagree and that the Court could — we think it makes the most sense for the Court to have the benefit of those materials —

THE COURT: I disagree, and I'm not going to do it.

I am not going to go through a -- a process where I have to anticipate objections, when the other side hasn't even figured it out yet.

If you contend you're entitled to summary judgment on a record that they may see, then we're going to go through that process first.

MS. POWELL: One last bit, then. It could put the Court in the awkward, perhaps impossible position of having to make an advisory position -- opinion of what its --

THE COURT: No. No, no, no.

Motion for Summary Judgment puts the burden on the moving party to show that the facts are undisputed, and you're entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

If you have undisputed facts that are disclosed to the

plaintiff and there isn't an issue of material fact, we go right to the legal arguments, and the record is plain and easy for an appellate court to review.

MS. POWELL: Right.

THE COURT: If you contend there are facts that are material, that can't be disclosed to the plaintiff, that's a different motion.

You can't have it both ways, and I'm not going to take on the responsibility of trying to infer whose interests are being gored based on the evaluation of one piece of evidence or another.

MS. POWELL: Your Honor -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: So if the Government -- I think the Government, first of all, needs to reevaluate its summary judgment record after this amended complaint gets filed and after we determine, first of all, is there jurisdiction.

If I conclude there's jurisdiction and we then have a complaint that — that clearly — because a complaint articulates a jurisdictional ground, then the Government needs to figure out whether its existing summary judgment motion can stand or it needs to reformat or refocus it, depending on where the plaintiffs have gone. Because you moved for summary judgment before the plaintiffs were even out of the gate. The record is narrowing and narrowing and narrowing.

I am not going to take on a responsibility to try to

segregate information in my mind between what the plaintiffs have seen and what they haven't seen, and then try to anticipate their responsive argument to material they haven't seen, if that's not necessary.

So I think the appropriate way to go is for -- first of all, for us to finish this jurisdictional process.

Secondly, for the Government then to -- the Government defendants to decide whether it wants to live with the summary judgment motion it filed. And, if so, it's going to need to make clear the bases for the motion, without reference to material that's not available to the plaintiff.

MS. POWELL: I'm sorry --

THE COURT: And then --

MS. POWELL: Go ahead.

THE COURT: -- and only then -- if the only basis on which the Government contends it can prevail is for the Court to take on the Classified Informations Procedures Act processes, and all of those other issues that have to do with protected or ex parte information, then we'll do that.

MS. POWELL: Your Honor, we're certainly happy to go forward as you suggest, in terms of dealing with the jurisdictional issues first. And --

THE COURT: Well, you know what? You don't get a choice. Jurisdiction is first. I can't -- I can't rule on --

MS. POWELL: I know -- I know, your Honor. I was -- I

was merely attempting to make clear what our position's likely 1 2 to be. I don't want to surprise the Court later. 3 THE COURT: Let's start over. What is it you want? 4 5 MS. POWELL: Your Honor, we can proceed as you suggest and deal with jurisdictional issues first, without objection 6 7 from the Government. 8 THE COURT: We have to deal with the jurisdictional 9 issue first. 10 MS. POWELL: I understand. 11 THE COURT: There isn't any one of us who has the 12 power to avoid it. Jurisdiction first. 13 Once jurisdiction is decided, then what? 14 MS. POWELL: The Government will move for summary 15 judgment --16 THE COURT: You have moved for summary judgment. MS. POWELL: I understand, your Honor. 17 18 THE COURT: I'm asking --19 MS. POWELL: On the current -- sorry. Go ahead. 20 THE COURT: You see the problem is the record is hard 21 to manage because of the Government's initial decision of this 22 conjoined motion, very early, before the plaintiffs' theories 23 had even been clearly identified, before these other -- this 24 other relief was resolved, as to the people who were waiting 25 outside of the U.S. to come in, and so forth.

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Here -- you have to decide whether the Motion for Summary Judgment you originally filed is fine in its form. if there's a way I can review it, without having to look at ex parte material. You have to decide whether that's possible. If it is, and your existing record is okay, then they'll respond to it, and we will go through a regular process, and I'll determine, are there issues of disputed fact or not? If not, are you entitled to judgment as a matter of law? MS. POWELL: It is possible, your Honor --THE COURT: Pardon me? MS. POWELL: I have a question for the Court, to make sure I understand the Court's position. Which is how would you like us to proceed if we believe, as we have put forward thus far, that the information is unnecessary but material? In other words, relevant to the issues before the Court, such that the Court disagreed with us, it would need to look at those materials before ruling against --THE COURT: I don't know, since I haven't tried to analyze your motion. So I -- I --I could put forward to you our basis for MS. POWELL: filing the ex parte materials, if that would be helpful.

THE COURT: No, it wouldn't, because I haven't tried

to evaluate why you're moving for summary judgment or how you

best can do that. I'm not an advocate here.

I'm trying to deal, first, with the most important issue, and that is, do we have jurisdiction in this court?

I'm very frustrated by the fact that that was intertwined with substantive motions that combined the additional problem of filing ex parte material, all of which drew all of the objections that are now on the table.

What I'm suggesting is we need to unpack some of this, so that we have a logical process going forward.

One option is for the Government to withdraw all of its motion, other than its motion — other than its Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and let me rule on it. And once that's ruled on, to take a look at what remains.

If there is jurisdiction, then to evaluate the plaintiffs' real complaint, this Second Amended Complaint that's going to be a concise statement that makes clear what the jurisdictional basis is and makes clear what the APA and due process claims are they're pursuing.

MS. POWELL: Understood.

THE COURT: And then decide, does it want to move for summary judgment, or not?

And if it does, does it need -- does -- do you, as a moving party, need to rely on material they're not going to get to look at?

If you do, then we first ought to evaluate the

fairness of that process before you launch off on another round of motions.

MS. POWELL: I get -- I believe I understand your Honor. And we're happy to withdraw the Motion for Summary Judgment until such time as the Court decides the jurisdictional issue.

THE COURT: That's only -- I'm only suggesting that -you know, in a perfect world, what would have happened is you
all would have come in after the first complaint -- after the
first complaint was filed. And we would have talked about a
series of motions that would have been logical in a
progression. It wouldn't have caused people to file motions
and oppositions that couldn't have been addressed.

There has -- there's just been a lot of diversion because of this process you launched into.

I appreciate the Government feels very strongly that the plaintiffs' claims need to be shut down. But there is a process for that too, and we can only do one step at a time.

MS. POWELL: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not saying the Government's motions have to be withdrawn. I'm simply saying I'm not going to address them prematurely. I'm also not going to address them in the first instance, based on information that the plaintiffs don't have, unless the moving party contends the only way they're entitled to summary judgment is by using information

not available to the plaintiff. In which case, before we get to summary judgment, we have to litigate the fairness of that process.

MS. POWELL: Understood, your Honor.

I suspect that what makes sense, should we get past these jurisdictional issues, that when the Government moves for summary judgment, it will — would it make sense for the Government to also say that if the Court cannot decide this on the basis of the public record, we can offer additional ex parte submissions, and provide a basis for doing so?

Does that make sense, as a logical way to proceed?

THE COURT: No. It does not make sense to me that you put the Court in the position of assisting a party -- one party or the other in obtaining a result, and that's -- that's how I'm hearing you. Because you're suggesting I read the record in a way that says you don't win process A. But if you do

You have to decide what information you contend you need for -- to prevail, if and when the record is ripe for summary judgment.

process B, you will. You're the moving party.

The other issue is a summary judgment that comes on the heels of a complaint being filed also precludes any opportunity for discovery, if there's going to be discovery; an evaluation of what other facts are out there.

I mean, if you all --

MS. POWELL: I think the parties -- I apologize. I thought you were done.

THE COURT: This really isn't advancing anything.

I'm simply explaining that right now the jurisdictional motion remains pending.

MS. POWELL: Understood, your Honor. We'll consult with our clients and reevaluate after the amended complaint is filed.

THE COURT: Okay. The motion, which is Docket No. 43, to the extent it concludes the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, it's still out there.

What about this Motion to Strike, then, for the plaintiff?

MS. CHOUDHURY: Your Honor, the Motion to Strike, you know, will be withdrawn when the defendants withdraw the summary judgment portion of that motion.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then I'm not making any rulings on any of that, other than having set the schedule that I've set. And so I look forward to receiving an amended complaint. A hopefully concise supplemental memorandum that simply points out where the jurisdictional line is not met, and then a concise reply. And then we'll get through the jurisdictional piece. And if, in the meantime, the Government decides it wants to do something with those motions -- I shouldn't say "something."

The only thing I would like to hear about is if you decide to withdraw them, the remaining motions, in which case you'll withdraw your Motion to Strike.

If you don't want to withdraw them, that's okay. We'll work with what you've got. But we have to take it one step at a time.

MS. KELLEHER: Your Honor, if we were to withdraw them, would we simply file a notice informing the Court of the docket entries?

THE COURT: Right. Right.

MS. KELLEHER: Okay. And just, your Honor, in terms of -- I wanted to give some background, in terms of our including both the Rule 19 jurisdictional issue and the merits.

When we spoke with your Honor on the phone in August, we had understood that the -- generally the Court doesn't -- is not in favor of sort of motions that don't necessarily advance the case if they're denied.

And so we sort of have included both in the sense that if your Honor is unpersuaded by our jurisdictional argument, essentially, then the Court could proceed with the merits.

THE COURT: Well, you're probably used to dealing with way smarter judges than I.

MS. KELLEHER: No, your Honor --

THE COURT: There is only so much we can process.

Jurisdiction is clearly a very big deal here. And

it's not a very clear issue, given the case law and given the nature of what it is the plaintiffs are arguing and the defendants are arguing.

This has sort of overtaken everything, and we need to get this straightened out in a legitimate and careful way.

If the case continues, then we need to figure out what's next. Which is, are the plaintiffs entitled to discovery before they're put to the burden of having to answer a summary judgment motion, or not?

Or have you all decided that enough of the material facts are already well known and undisputed that you got that record, and now we're just going to go to do they have a claim?

MS. KELLEHER: We did have some of that back and forth with counsel.

THE COURT: I know you did. I know you did. It's just that you're trying to do too much simultaneously, and maybe you can do that with a smarter judge. This one can't. We're going to do it one step at a time.

I need to be confident that we have the authority to act, if we're going to get into any of that. And I also think, just as a matter of fairness, if we're going to have a process in which either party asks the Court to consider information not available to the other, that we have a process to ensure that's the only way we can go forward.

There are occasions when that happens. In the

criminal setting, it happens a lot. And it's a very uncomfortable place for the Court to be, because it does put the Court in the position of having to anticipate the counterarguments that an advocate would be making, when that advocate doesn't even know what it is that's being proffered.

So I far prefer the usual open and spirited process of the type we've been engaged in. And if we can process the case that way, great. If we can't, and I must engage in the review of ex parte material, I will. But only if we have to.

MS. KELLEHER: Well, we'll certainly take that back.

And we apologize, to the extent the -- it seemed as if we were rushing the issues for the Court.

THE COURT: Everybody's anxious to get a decision.

Unfortunately, it's a tough process that we have to take very carefully. These are important issues for everybody.

And I appreciate, Counsel, all of your work. Please don't take my earnest questions the wrong way. I want to be sure we get this right. I want to be sure we're in the right court when you litigate.

So let's -- let's take it -- this -- the next steps, and we'll do just that.

So all I -- the only order I'm entering today is plaintiff has leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, compliant with Rule 8, and that lays out a jurisdictional basis, so that I can continue to evaluate the jurisdictional

I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the oral proceedings had in the above-entitled matter this 31st day of January, 2011. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

/S/ Amanda M. LeGore

AMANDA M. LeGORE, RDR, CRR, FCRR, CE